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Abstract — Of late, rapid growth observed in the cloud
technology. Data sharing is an essential functionality in cloud
storage. In this paper, we show how to efficiently, securely and
flexibly share data with others in cloud storage. We describe
new public-key cryptosystems that produce constant-size
ciphertexts such that efficient delegation of decryption rights
for any set of ciphertexts is possible. The novelty is that one
can aggregate any set of secret keys and make them as
compact as a single key, but encompassing the power of all the
keys being aggregated. In other words, the secret key holder
can release a constant-size aggregate key for flexible choices of
ciphertext set in cloud storage, but the other encrypted files
outside the set remain confidential. This compact aggregate
key can be conveniently sent to others or be stored in a smart
card with very limited secure storage. We provide formal
security analysis of our schemes in the standard model. We
also describe other application of our schemes. In particular,
our schemes give the first public-key patient-controlled
encryption for flexible hierarchy, which was yet to be known.
Keywords — Cloud storage, data sharing, key-aggregate
encryption, patient-controlled encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Storing data in a cloud is become a common phenomenon
recently. In enterprise settings, we see the rise in demand
for data outsourcing, which assists in the strategic
management of corporate data. It is also used as a core
technology behind many online services for personal
applications. Nowadays, it is easy to apply for free accounts
for email, photo album, and file sharing and/or remote
access, with storage size more than 25 GB (or a few dollars
for more than 1 TB). Together with the current wireless
technology, users can access almost all of their files and
emails by a mobile phone in any corner of the world.
Considering data privacy, a traditional way to ensure it is to
rely on the server to enforce the access control after
authentication (e.g., [1]), which means any unexpected
privilege escalation will expose all data. In a shared-tenancy
cloud computing environment, things become even worse.
Data from different clients can be hosted on separate virtual
machines (VMs) but reside on a single physical machine.
Data in a target VM could be stolen by instantiating another
VM co-resident with the target one [2]. Regarding
availability of files, there are a series of cryptographic
schemes which go as far as allowing a third-party auditor to
check the availability of files on behalf of the data owner
without leaking anything about the data [3], or without
compromising the data owners anonymity [4]. Likewise,
cloud users probably will not hold the strong belief that the
cloud server is doing a good job in terms of confidentiality.
A cryptographic solution, for example, [5], with proven
security relied on number-theoretic assumptions is more
desirable, whenever the user is not perfectly happy with
trusting the security of the VM or the honesty of the
technical staff. These users are motivated to encrypt their
data with their own keys before uploading them to the
server.
Data sharing is an important functionality in cloud storage.
For example, bloggers can let their friends view a subset of
their private pictures; an enterprise may grant her
employees access to a portion of sensitive data. The
challenging problem is how to effectively share encrypted
data. Of course users can download the encrypted data from
the storage, decrypt them, then send them to others for
sharing, but it loses the value of cloud storage. Users should
be able to delegate the access rights of the sharing data to
others so that they can access these data from the server
directly. However, finding an efficient and secure way to
share partial data in cloud storage is not trivial. Below we
will take Dropbox1 as an example for illustration.
Assume that Alice puts all her private photos on Dropbox,
and she does not want to expose her photos to everyone.
Due to various data leakage possibility Alice cannot feel
relieved by just relying on the privacy protection
mechanisms provided by Dropbox, so she encrypts all the
photos using her own keys before uploading. One day,
Alice’s friend, Bob, asks her to share the photos taken over
all these years which Bob appeared in. Alice can then use
the share function of Dropbox, but the problem now is how
International Journal of Science Engineering and AdvanceTechnology, IJSEAT, Vol 3, Issue 9 ISSN 2321-6905September-2015
www.ijseat.com Page 462
to delegate the decryption rights for these photos to Bob. A
possible option Alice can choose is to securely send Bob
the secret keys involved. Naturally, there are two extreme
ways for her under the traditional encryption paradigm:
 Alice encrypts all files with a single encryption key and
gives Bob the corresponding secret key directly.
 Alice encrypts files with distinct keys and sends Bob
the corresponding secret keys.
Obviously, the first method is inadequate since all un-
chosen data may be also leaked to Bob. For the second
method, there are practical concerns on efficiency. The
number of such keys is as many as the number of the shared
photos, say, a thousand. Transferring these secret keys
inherently requires a secure channel, and storing these keys
requires rather expensive secure storage. The costs and
complexities involved generally increase with the number
of the decryption keys to be shared. In short, it is very
heavy and costly to do that.
Encryption keys also come with two flavors—symmetric
key or asymmetric (public) key. Using symmetric
encryption, when Alice wants the data to be originated from
a third party, she has to give the encryptor her secret key;
obviously, this is not always desirable. By contrast, the
encryption key and decryption key are different in
publickey encryption. The use of public-key encryption
gives more flexibility for our applications. For example, in
enterprise settings, every employee can upload encrypted
data on the cloud storage server without the knowledge of
the company’s master-secret key.
Therefore, the best solution for the above problem is that
Alice encrypts files with distinct public-keys, but only
sends Bob a single (constant-size) decryption key. Since the
decryption key should be sent via a secure channel and kept
secret, small key size is always desirable. For example, we
cannot expect large storage for decryption keys in the
resource-constraint devices like smart phones, smart cards,
or wireless sensor nodes. Especially, these secret keys are
usually stored in the tamper-proof memory, which is
relatively expensive. The present research efforts mainly
focus on minimizing the communication requirements (such
as bandwidth, rounds of communication) like aggregate
signature [6]. However, not much has been done about the
key itself.
II. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In modern cryptography, a fundamental problem we often
study is about leveraging the secrecy of a small piece of
knowledge into the ability to perform cryptographic
functions (e.g., encryption, authentication) multiple times.
In this paper, we study how to make a decryption key more
powerful in the sense that it allows decryption of multiple
ciphertexts, without increasing its size. Specifically, our
problem statement is
“To design an efficient public-key encryption scheme
which supports flexible delegation in the sense that any
subset of the ciphertexts (produced by the encryption
scheme) is decryptable by a constant-size decryption key
(generated by the owner of the master-secret key)?”
We solve this problem by introducing a special type of
public-key encryption which we call key-aggregate
cryptosystem (KAC). In KAC, users encrypt a message not
only under a public-key, but also under an identifier of
ciphertext called class. That means the ciphertexts are
further categorized into different classes. The key owner
holds a master-secret called master-secret key, which can be
used to extract secret keys for different classes. More
importantly, the extracted key have can be an aggregate key
which is as compact as a secret key for a single class, but
aggregates the power of many such keys, i.e., the
decryption power for any subset of ciphertext classes.
Figure 1 Alice share files with identifiers 2, 3, 6 and 8 with
Bob by sending him a single aggregate key.
With our solution, Alice can simply send Bob a single
aggregate key via a secure e-mail. Bob can download the
encrypted photos from Alice’s Dropbox space and then use
this aggregate key to decrypt these encrypted photos. The
scenario is depicted in Fig. 1.
The sizes of ciphertext, public-key, master-secret key, and
aggregate key in our KAC schemes are all of constant size.
The public system parameter has size linear in the number
of ciphertext classes, but only a small part of it is needed
each time and it can be fetched on demand from large (but
non-confidential) cloud storage.
Previous results may achieve a similar property featuring a
constant-size decryption key, but the classes need to
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conform to some predefined hierarchical relationship. Our
work is flexible in the sense that this constraint is
eliminated, that is, no special relation is required between
the classes.
We propose several concrete KAC schemes with different
security levels and extensions in this paper. All
constructions can be proven secure in the standard model.
To the best of our knowledge, our aggregation mechanism
in KAC has not been investigated.
III. KEY-AGGREGATE ENCRYPTION
A key-aggregate encryption scheme consists of five
polynomial-time algorithms as follows.
The data owner establishes the public system
parameter via Setup and generates a public/master-secret
key pair via KeyGen. Messages can be encrypted via
Encrypt by anyone who also decides what ciphertext class
is associated with the plaintext message to be encrypted.
The data owner can use the master-secret to generate an
aggregate decryption key for a set of ciphertext classes via
Extract. The generated keys can be passed to delegates
securely (via secure e-mails or secure devices) finally; any
user with an aggregate key can decrypt any ciphertext
provided that the ciphertext’s class is contained in the
aggregate key via Decrypt.
 Setup(1λ, n): executed by the data owner to setup an
account on an untrusted server. On input a security
level parameter 1 λ and the number of ciphertext
classes n (i.e., class index should be an integer bounded
by 1 and n), it outputs the public system parameter
param, which is omitted from the input of the other
algorithms for brevity.
 KeyGen: executed by the data owner to
randomlygenerate a public/master-secret key pair (pk;
msk).
 Encrypt(pk,i,m): executed by anyone who wants to
encrypt data. On input a public-key pk, an index i
denoting the ciphertext class, and a message m, it
outputs a ciphertext C.
 Extract(msk,S): executed by the data owner for
delegating the decrypting power for a certain set of
ciphertext classes to a delegatee. On input the master-
secret key msk and a set S of indices corresponding to
different classes, it outputs the aggregate key for set S
denoted by KS.
 Decrypt(KS, S, I, C): executed by a delegatee who
received an aggregate key KS generated by Extract. On
input KS, the set S, an index i denoting the ciphertext
class the ciphertext C belongs to, and C, it outputs the
decrypted result m if i € S.
Sharing Encrypted Data
A canonical application of KAC is data sharing. The key
aggregation property is especially useful when we expect
the delegation to be efficient and flexible. The schemes
enable a content provider to share her data in a confidential
and selective way, with a fixed and small ciphertext
expansion, by distributing to each authorized user a single
and small aggregate key.
Figure 2 Using KAC for data sharing in cloud storage.
Sharing Encrypted Data
A canonical application of KAC is data sharing. The key
aggregation property is especially useful when we expect
the delegation to be efficient and flexible. The schemes
enable a content provider to share her data in a confidential
and selective way, with a fixed and small ciphertext
expansion, by distributing to each authorized user a single
and small aggregate key.
Here, we describe the main idea of data sharing in cloud
storage using KAC, illustrated in Fig. 2. Suppose Alice wants
to share her data m1,m2, . . .,mv on the server. She first
performs Setup(1λ, n) to get param and execute KeyGen to
get the public/master-secret key pair (pk, msk). The system
parameter param and public-key pk can be made public and
master-secret key msk should be kept secret by Alice. Anyone
(including Alice herself) can then encrypt each mi by Ci=
Encrypt(pk, I,mi). The encrypted data are uploaded to the
server.
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With param and pk, people who cooperate with Alice can
update Alice’s data on the server. Once Alice is willing to
share a set S of her data with a friend Bob, she can compute
the aggregate key KS for Bob by performing Extract(msk,
S). Since KS is just a constant-size key, it is easy to be sent
to Bob via a secure e-mail.
After obtaining the aggregate key, Bob can download the
data he is authorized to access. That is, for each i € S, Bob
downloads Ci (and some needed values in param) from the
server. With the aggregate key KS, Bob can decrypt each Ci
by Decrypt(KS, S, ,Ci) for each i € S.
IV. RELATED WORK
We start by discussing the most relevant study in the
literature of cryptography/security. Cryptographic key
assignment schemes ([8]) aim to minimize the expense in
storing and managing secret keys for general cryptographic
use. Utilizing a tree structure, a key for a given branch can
be used to derive the keys of its descendant nodes (but not
the other way round). Just granting the parent key implicitly
grants all the keys of its descendant nodes. Sandhu
proposed a method to generate a tree hierarchy of
symmetric-keys by using repeated evaluations of
pseudorandom function/blockcipher on a fixed secret. The
concept can be generalized from a tree to a graph. More
advanced cryptographic key assignment schemes support
access policy that can be modeled by an acyclic graph or a
cyclic graph [7]. Most of these schemes produce keys for
symmetric-key cryptosystems, even though the key
derivations may require modular arithmetic as used in
public-key cryptosystems, which are generally more
expensive than “symmetric-key operations” such as
pseudorandom function.
We take the tree structure as an example. Alice can first
classify the ciphertext classes according to their subjects.
Each node in the tree represents a secret key, while the leaf
nodes represents the keys for individual ciphertext classes.
Filled circles represent the keys for the classes to be
delegated and circles circumvented by dotted lines represent
the keys to be granted. Note that every key of the non-leaf
node can derive the keys of its descendant nodes.
However, it is still difficult for general cases. As shown in,
if Alice shares her demo music at work (“work”! “casual”!
“demo” and “work”! “confidential” ! “demo”) with a
colleague who also has the rights to see some of her
personal data, what she can do is to give more keys, which
leads to an increase in the total key size. One can see that
this approach is not flexible when the classifications are
more complex and she wants to share different sets of files
to different people. For this delegatee in our example, the
number of granted secret keys becomes the same as the
number of classes. In general, hierarchical approaches can
solve the problem partially if one intends to share all files
under a certain branch in the hierarchy. On average, the
number of keys increases with the number of branches. It is
unlikely to come up with a hierarchy that can save the
number of total keys to be granted for all individuals (which
can access a different set of leaf-nodes) simultaneously.
V. CONCLUSION
How to protect users’ data privacy is a central question of
cloud storage. With more mathematical tools, cryptographic
schemes are getting more versatile and often involve
multiple keys for a single application. In this paper, we
consider how to “compress” secret keys in public-key
cryptosystems which support delegation of secret keys for
different ciphertext classes in cloud storage. No matter
which one among the power set of classes, the delegatee
can always get an aggregate key of constant size. Our
approach is more flexible than hierarchical key assignment
which can only save spaces if all key-holders share a
similar set of privileges.
Although the parameter can be downloaded with
ciphertexts, it would be better if its size is independent of
the maximum number of ciphertext classes. On the other
hand, when one carries the delegated keys around in a
mobile device without using special trusted hardware, the
key is prompt to leakage, designing a leakage-resilient
cryptosystem [9], [10] yet allows efficient and flexible key
delegation is also an interesting direction.
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